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HISTORY AND PSYCHOLOGY: SHALL THE TWAIN EVER MEET?
S. Ray Granade and Randall D. Wight
Ouachita Baptist University
As all detectives (fictional or real) know, every story contains at least an element 
of  truth, and the most likely is usually the most truthful.  Those trying to cover their 
tracks know or discover to their dismay that interrogators use that principle to their 
own advantage.  Early in Mark Twain’s The Adventures of  Huckleberry Finn, the 
disguised Huck realizes this simple reality when he first returns to town after his faked 
death and “pumps” Mrs. Judith Loftus for information: “Somehow it didn’t seem to 
me that I said it [his name] was Mary before,” Huck relates; “seemed to me I said it 
was Sarah; so I felt sort of  cornered, and was afeared maybe I was looking it, 
too.” ([Garden City, NY: Nelson Doubleday, nd], p. 56).  Huck’s outlandish fabrications 
always land him in trouble.  As Jack Higgins has the redoubtable Liam Devlin note of  
his “cover” in The Eagle Has Flown, “the best kind of  lie is the one that sticks closest 
to the truth.”(p.165, 1991).
Various disciplines have various methods, or tools, for assessing truth and thus 
telling likely stories to explain the facts at hand.  Again as all good detectives know, the 
more tools at one’s disposal, the greater the probability of  ascertaining and 
constructing a credible account of  the world.  This article urges adding the tool of  
historical methodology to students’ research repertories.  Our urging is based on our 
conceptions of  the scholar as detective, of  man as human, of  student as scholar, of  
history and psychology as disciplines, of  cognition, and of  research.  Some of  this may 
sound heretical; we ask your indulgence and your assent that heresies contain some 
element of  truth.
Our first heresy denies the assertion of  psychology as science: psychology is 
science and something more.  In a recent general psychology textbook, Peter Gray 
offers what we submit is a more accurate characterization of  psychology than 
psychology-as-science:  psychology as science and humanity.  The discipline stands at 
the intersection of  the various disciplines of  intellectual labor and informs all those 
divisions equally.  We do not assert that psychology informs the humanities or that the 
humanities inform psychology--both assertions are correct, as even a cursory 
examination of  Freud’s work and influences reveal.  We contend that if  psychology is 
to grapple fully with the richness of  behavior and experience, then the discipline must 
incorporate and utilize the perspectives and methodologies of  humanistic pursuits.
This argument is far from unique, or even new.  Wundt’s division, deriving from 
his roots in German idealism, of  psychology into Naturwissenschaften and 
Geisteswissenschaften accented this conception of  the field.  In his autobiography, 
Harvey Carr expressed doubt that even as fine a tool as the experimental method 
could be psychology’s sole tool.  More recently, Jim Korn made the argument in a 1985 
Teaching of  Psychology essay.  In speaking of  the implications of  the humanities for 
“a whole of  psychology,” Korn noted the need to recognize “the place of  psychology 
at the intersection of  all disciplines that deal with the human mind and the behavior of  
living things.”  He called for a change in thinking that would result in psychologists 
teaching the discipline from scientific and humanistic perspectives.  Korn cries for a 
humanist model that shows students “perspectives and experiences in other minds and 
other times,” exploring “values, the meaning of  life, and images of  humanity” through 
qualitative as well as quantitative methodology.  Haltingly, Korn even mentions the 
possibility of  a course in narrative portrayal and criticism to “replace one of  the many 
courses we require in statistics and experimental design.”  The test of  significance, he 
concludes, is personal, with stories used to enhance understanding.  As teachers, we 
may not reject science, but we must balance empirical and nonempirical approaches to 
our discipline:  “The complete psychologist could do both and would teach 
both.” [FTN NEEDED!!!]
We argue for an understanding of  the complexity of  humanity.  As Edwin 
O’Conner’s priest, Father Hugh Kennedy, characterizes his relationship with his 
parishioners in The Edge of  Sadness, “it’s true that I had never been deliberately 
unkind or cruel.”(p.131).  “I’d always behaved well, I’d never hurt them or scandalized 
them, I’d always treated them with decency and kindness.”(p.427).  Then, comparing 
himself  to antebellum plantation-owners, he noted that “decency and kindness can be 
overrated,” for one “small fault” he shared with decent and kind slaveowners was that 
he “didn’t regard [his parishioners] as human beings like himself.”(p.427).  Kennedy’s 
close friend and fellow priest, John Carmody, shared his common fault.  As John’s 
sister Helen described it, “he was wonderfully intelligent...but he just wasn’t much 
good about people.  About what they were really like, or why they did certain things.  
He wasn’t very interested in them to begin with, and I guess you have to be that if  
you’re going to find out anything about them.” (pp.441-1).  As Huck Finn revealed, 
“After supper she [Widow Douglas] got out her book and learned me about Moses and 
the Bulrushers, and I was in a sweat to find out all about him; but by and by she let it 
out that Moses had been dead a considerable long time; so then I didn’t care no more 
about him, because I don’t take no stock in dead people.”(p.2)
Our second heresy maintains that a cognitive psychology that does not deviate 
from an analysis of  cognitive structure and the measurement of  real-time mental 
operations will fail to address the richness of  the thought process.  In his 1986 book 
Actual Minds, Possible Worlds, Jerome Bruner submits that there exist two modes of  
thought that are irreducible to one another:  logico-scientific and narrative.  One deals 
with arguments, the other stories; one validates its propositions by appeal to formal 
and empirical tests, the other by plausibility and coherence of  analogy; one investigates 
functions, the other purpose.  Bruner illustrates the distinction by noting the difference 
in meaning of  the word “then” in “if  x, then y” versus “the king died, then the queen 
died.”
Our third heresy contends that the experimental method as the exclusive tool for 
psychological research impoverishes the discipline.  Psychologists often define their 
discipline as the scientific study of  the behavior and experience of  organisms.  We 
submit that psychology as systematic study might more closely address the character of  
psychological phenomena.  The scientific method utilizes observation, literature 
searches, and experimentation to produce an account that is most consistent with 
current data.  Good science uses rigorous methodology to avoid premature judgments 
based on opinions rather than facts.  Its explanations are only as good as the data, 
always subject to change, and determined by good analysis and interpretation.
Scholarship need not interpret the scientific method in only one way to achieve 
rigor and exactness.  Granted, measuring the increase in foot-candles needed to 
perceive an increase in a stimulus’s intensity may seem more exacting than assessing the 
influences prompting a given decision by a specific individual in a unique context at a 
known place and time, but such is not the case.  The subject matter of  the 
humanities--that is, the comings, goings, and doings of  humans qua humans--does not 
readily yield itself  to 2x3 factorial designs.  Nevertheless, even if  one cannot be 
scientific in the narrower sense, one can rely on the broader reaches of  the scientific 
method--and systematic research can reveal much about behavior and experience that 
is inaccessible to scientific variable manipulation.  It can produce, as Stephen Jay 
Gould noted of  biological insights in The Mismeasure of  Man (which he called a 
“historical analysis of  conceptual errors.” [p.317]), “fruitful analogies.” (p.327).
Assuming that these heresies have truth, that psychology is one of  the 
humanities and that accounts of  psychological relevance can emerge from systematic 
research and narrative formation, how might psychologists teach this method of  
inquiry to their students?  We contend that the most readily-adaptable course is that of  
historical research.
The word “history” has four general usages: an event, a scholarly account of  an 
event, the process of  examining evidence of  the event and producing an account, or 
colloquial accounts of  events (folk history, origin myths, and the like).  History takes 
the totality of  human experience as its subject: human nature and the record of  what 
humankind has thought, said, and done.  As historian George M. Trevelyan noted, 
history has for its object “everything that is intimate, everything that is passionate, 
everything also that is trivial or daily occurrence, all the color and all the infinite variety 
of  the past” (p.121).  History studies the character of  an individual; or a race, people, 
family or other group; or of  a period (age, reign, administration).  It endeavors to 
understand humans as individuals and as members of  a variety of  social units.  It seeks 
the important or significant in human existence and illuminates it for analysis.  It finds 
significance and importance in both typical and atypical, for each illustrates something 
of  the human condition.  In sum, history investigates and records past human 
activities, and the causal relations and development of  these activities in relation to 
their time and location in a search for significance.  Our focus is history as record and 
process: as a tool for acquiring knowledge about human behavior and experience.
Historical method is the systematic body of  principles and rules designed to aid 
in gathering effectively the source-materials of  history, appraising them critically, and 
presenting a synthesis of  the results achieved.  Three major operations mark the 
method: the search for sources from which to draw information (heuristic); the 
appraisal of  sources and their contents for evidential value (criticism); and the formal 
statement of  findings (communication).  These operations often overlap and are not 
mutually exclusive.  Historical training is thus aimed at providing skill in source 
assembly, at critical assessment, and at results presentation with effect.  Failure at any 
one of  the three operations damns the effort.  Historical study, apart from a few terms 
used in methodology, lacks technical terminology, and, jargonless, stands as an 
effective means of  communicating with all disciplines.
Caveats and assumptions now intrude.  First, history is not an ex post facto 
dynamic analysis of  an individual’s psychological machinations, so we exclude out-of-
hand what has sometimes been called psychohistory (e.g. Freud’s treatment of  
Michelangelo or Woodrow Wilson).  Second, despite a currently-popular assertion that 
specific cultural cliques create “facts,” historians (like all detectives) must stick to “the 
facts.”  Historians elicit from primary source material facts that are demonstrable and 
verifiable, though generally irreproducable.  Third, historical events are a constant; how 
much we know or what we think is a variable.  Fourth, historians realize that historical 
research resembles listening to seashells--what one hears of  the past is pale imitation 
of  event.  Different cultures, individuals and eras place different emphases and 
interpretations on the sounds.  In short, our understanding of  events (facts) is 
conditioned by our world view.  Fifth, historians must approach with care any subject 
in which they have some emotional investment.  Honest historians always ask “Am I 
trying to know or judge?”  Finally, all these assumptions being made, the historian like 
the detective falls back on one criterion in collecting clues (facts) and making cases--the 
principle of  honest solution: would a reasonable individual, given the same clues and 
circumstances, come to a similar conclusion?
One of  the most oft-used analogies in speaking of  the historian’s task is that of  
detective, or intelligence-officer (it is no accident that Tom Clancey’s Cold-War hero is 
a trained historian).  The historian constantly searches for information, seeking clues in 
all manner of  places and sorting out those that turn up.  The metaphor (like all 
metaphors) is imperfect, but good teaching requires capturing student imagination--
and besides, who said scholarship can’t be fun?
The methodology behind “honest solution” involves a series of  questions.  
Historical methodology rests not on formal hypothesis, but upon a fundamental 
question, or topic, which prompts other questions in the search for truth.  Arriving at 
the crime scene (defining your focus) requires formulating good questions and asking 
the right ones.  Initially those questions are reducible to three: means (what happened, 
the manner in which events occurred), opportunity (how did it happen, the conditions, 
context, or as Robert Penn Warren once observed, “the milieu,” which fostered and 
facilitated both event and behavior), and motive (why did it happen, the implicit and 
explicit reasons for behavior, that part of  the process over which all historians argue--
causation).
Surveying the crime scene involves recognizing relevant data.  Anything that 
changes has a history, but like any skilled perpetrator those events are mute.  The 
detective or historian must seek traces left behind in documents or other sources, 
extracting every nuance of  detail to make the case or tell the story.
What is evidence?  You notice a grenadine stain on the rug, recall that last night 
your best friend vomited after three tequila sunrises, and conclude that in the future 
you’ll have to ration drinks.  You’ve just committed an act of  history:  you 
reconstructed a prior episode and made generalizations based on your reconstruction.  
Evidence is simply that which assists in establishing a sequence of  events and deciding 
what to do next.  Historical work is not always as neat and clearcut, but the principle is 
the same.
To detectives, every fact initially carries the same weight.  Even if  clue becomes 
red herring and following it to closure fails to solve the mystery, information has been 
gathered and possibilities eliminated.  History is as much what did not happen as what 
did.  As the detective works toward a solution to the mystery, a rank-ordering of  the 
clues emerges.  The extraneous can be eliminated and the relevant remains like panned 
gold to make the case.
A clue’s source plays an important role in this rank-ordering.  Like detectives, 
historians must ask “How valid (reliable) are my sources?”  Reliability rests on several 
criteria.  First is the issue of  primary (eyewitness) versus secondary (hearsay) sources.  
Second is the issue of  bias.  Primary sources are inherently more reliable than 
secondary ones, but even they contain bias.  The historian-detective must ask “Why 
was the record preserved and by whom?”
Just as the detective has a crime laboratory, so has historian; the historian’s is a 
library, and more specifically an archives, which houses most primary sources.  Because 
most primary sources are unique materials, they require special handling and 
safeguards.  The climate controls and security of  an archives meet those needs.  To that 
end, each collection within the archives has its own finding aid.  For most collections, a 
hint of  their usefulness can be found in the National Union Catalog of  Manuscript 
Collections, where most archives register their collections along with basic 
information--including the existence of  a finding aid.
Were primary sources found only in archives, undergraduates would find 
historical research at any meaningful level impossible.  Fortunately many primary 
materials have been published; one thus has access to the letters of  luminaries such as 
William James, James McKeen Cattell, Hugo Munsterberg, and Edward Bradford 
Titchener.  Outside psychology one can find a plethora of  letter collections, papers, 
diaries, autobiographies, newspapers and obscure journals.  Some archives have even 
made parts of  their collections available on microform.  Finally, for some events an 
interview (oral history) with a participant or witness is a possibility.
Often the primacy of  sources rests on their use rather than the arbitrary 
categorization noted above.  All academicians are familiar with a textbook writer 
copying another textbook writer who is copying yet another for the account of  a given 
event in the latest edition, the Watson-Rayner rat-rabbit problem and the depictions of  
Pavlov’s apparatus being glaring examples.  Clearly textbooks are a secondary source.  
But what if  one is attempting to examine what the discipline said about itself  and then 
analyze how that telling has evolved?  What about the evolution of  our contemporary 
notion of  what constitutes an acceptable experiment through the various editions of  
Robert S. Woodward’s textbook?  In this instance, textbooks become primary sources 
because of  their use.
The question of  source bias is perhaps best illustrated with eyewitness accounts 
and autobiography.  Recall Elizabeth Loftus’s demonstration that eyewitness accounts 
are not wholly trustworthy, or Frederick C. Bartlett’s that we innocently reconstruct 
events to match our world view, or Marcia Johnson’s that autobiographical memory 
fails to distinguish between intentions and actions.  The autobiographical accounts of  
which psychologists are so fond would appear to be incredibly poor historical 
accounts, though they are wonderful points of  triangulation when sorting through 
materials.  Like detectives, historians are interested in truth, be it open or concealed 
behind untruth.
After ascertaining what happened at the crime scene and reviewing possible 
relevant data (clues), the detective begins active sleuthing for clues and the historian-
detective begins data gathering.  Just as the detective searches exhaustively for clues, so 
the historian asks “Where might one find facts; who might have recorded portions of  
the tale, and where might that data survive?”  No source is too mundane or too far-
fetched to escape perusal.  The historian-detective pursues the suspect through the 
bibliographical labyrinth.  That labyrinth contains chambers of  books, articles, 
newspapers, documents, oral history, memorabilia and other physical evidence; the 
good historian-detective always goes to the crime scene.
Sleuthing’s first step is to find what is already common knowledge about this 
person, place, thing, issue, event, practice, or institution.  The second step is more 
intuitive:  does this sound like the complete story, convincing, creditable, authoritative, 
with no loose ends?  Are points in conflict, or does the story sound too “pat”?
As data-gathering continues, a primary question becomes “Do I have enough 
evidence to make a case?”  The answer often depends on the jury.  If, after finding 
grenadine on your rug, you’re making a case to your spouse that your best friend can’t 
hold his liquor, then perhaps all you’ll need is the spot.  If  you wish to make the case 
to your friend, a pattern of  spots might be in order.  If  you’re attempting to make the 
case before a magistrate that your friend has a drinking problem and should be tossed 
into detox for six weeks, not even the pattern would likely be enough.  When do you 
have enough?--when you’ve established the sequence of  events and satisfied the 
profession’s demands for a complete, convincing, credible, authoritative, documented 
story.  If  a crucial piece of  evidence is missing, the case is not complete; if  
contradictory evidence exists, you must have an explanation--you CANNOT ignore it.  
Only when you have tied up all loose ends is the case complete.
Also as sleuthing continues, witnesses must be interrogated; the historian-
detective must constantly evaluate the evidence--first for authenticity, and only then for 
significance and meaning.  Like detectives, historians are more than mere questioners.  
Like the detective, the historian turns inquisitor, ferreting out each clue as if  by torture.  
Both seek to separate fact from fiction, guarding self  and source from bias and 
prejudice insofar as possible.  Recognizing the existence of  those forces which would 
taint the study, the historian-detective stands ever vigilant, watcher in the shadows, 
anxious to preserve the study’s purity.
Historical research is a lonely task uncongenial to group efforts.  Anyone who 
has ever sent another to the library to obtain a copy of  an article known to be there, 
only to have that messenger return with the assertion that no such journal exists, 
knows what we mean.  Whoever is familiar with the data is best equipped to judge a 
source’s validity and thus a given piece of  information’s place, if  any, in the puzzle.  
Historians are generally suspicious of  editors and research assistants.
One reason for this truism is that the moment of  data collection is often the 
foundation moment of  evaluation.  How a collection is arranged, for example, can 
offer insights into the data.  Letters are most useful if  they’re found in a collection 
untouched by organizing hands other than those of  the originator or recipient.  
Individual items can best be understood in the context of  their larger corpus, that 
original organization which historians and archivists call provenance in a collection.  
Those who insist on keeping all the money in their billfold turned or folded in a 
certain way, for example, can certainly be differentiated from those who stuff  wadded 
clumps of  currency into random pockets of  a twenty-two pocket vest!
Assuming a document’s authenticity, the historian-detective must ask to what end 
it was written, to what end preserved.  What author’s concerns, what assumptions 
about the recipient shaped the item?  Was the intent to explain or persuade, abide by 
convention or speak from the heart?  William Byrd of  Virginia, for example, kept two 
sets of  diaries--one for “public” consumption, the other (in code) for his own.
The moment of  data collection is the foundation moment for interpretation as 
well as analysis or evaluation.  Interpretation is based on the historian-detective’s 
principal tool--self-awareness--since one’s worldview governs the perception of  one’s 
clues.  To illustrate, a perhaps apocryphal story from Kenneth Spence’s lab, where a 
dead rat hung from a nailed on the bulletin board beneath the inscription “This rat 
showed latent learning.”  To paraphrase E.C. Tolman, the worst assumptions are 
implicit assumptions; they can get a detective killed or torpedo a historian’s entire 
effort.  Consider the historian’s “pathetic fallacy,” sometimes referred to as presentism.  
Various forms of  this error exist, but the basic idea is to analyze the past apart from its 
context, or with personal or contemporary values.  An example is the attempt of  some 
authors of  experimental papers to show, in their introductions, the long line of  great 
studies that logically lead to the study the author is about to describe.
As a discipline, history relies upon certain philosophical tenets which inform 
interpretation.  Historians must possess a critical sense which ranges between 
hypercritical rejection and uncritical acceptance of  all, and which recognizes that 
suppressing truth is asserting falsehood.  Historians must possess a detached and 
neutral attitude toward their subjects; while they cannot be free of  all prejudices, they 
cannot indulge those predispositions and must always be on guard against them.  
Judgments and conclusions, though allowed and even required, must rest solely upon 
the evidence.  Historians must possess industry, for the nature of  historical research 
requires application and time for grubbing in libraries and archives, tracking down 
elusive facts, deciphering texts, collating data and reducing it to unity and meaning.  
Historians must possess concentration, that increasingly-rare facility of  mental 
alertness which seizes upon all information from all sources which help one master the 
subject.  All these tenets come to bear at the point of  data collection, but also instruct 
the last phase of  the case.
Historians are not content with finding out the story; they must tell it as well.  In 
its telling, historians find themselves most closely allied with the humanities.  While 
historians may seek truth creatively, and use sources creatively to discover the story, 
creativity also comes in the telling.  It is here that historians call upon their skills to 
create anew that bygone time, to reconstruct that reality and make it intelligible to all 
and sundry.  Historians hold that jargon obfuscates and that clarity must be the aim of  
the narrative.  If  the story is told but not comprehended, then of  what use is the 
telling?  The historian’s audience determines the appropriate level of  language, but 
narrative possessing force and clarity is always in vogue.  As always, the act of  writing 
brings form to understanding; one writes to know.
In a literary criticism of  James Fenimore Cooper entitled “Fenimore Cooper’s 
Literary Offenses,” Mark Twain cites rules for writing which he then applied to 
Cooper’s prose.  Those rules have their place in this discussion, for they have great 
application to history as a humanities-oriented discipline, and to the place which 
historical research can have in teaching undergraduates about psychology.
Saying that nineteen rules govern literary art (and observing that some say there 
are twenty-two), Twain humorously notes that Cooper violated eighteen of  them in the 
space of  two-thirds of  a page.  Twain then goes on to note the eighteen:  1. That a 
story accomplish something and arrive somewhere (linear development); 2. That the 
episodes be necessary, and help develop the story; 3. That the personages be alive, 
except for the corpses, and that readers always be able to tell the corpses from the 
others; 4. That the characters, both dead and alive, “exhibit a sufficient excuse for 
being here” (why are the characters there; produce those germane to the case); 5. That 
conversations be germane, interesting, have a discoverable purpose and meaning, and 
terminate gracefully; 6. That the conduct and conversation of  individuals match their 
character as described; 7. That characters be consistent in their actions and 
conversations; 8. That “crass stupidities” not be “played upon the reader” (like 
multiple shots from a single-shot pistol without reloading); 9. That the story confine 
itself  to possibilities “and let miracles alone” (or if  miracles be ventured, let them be 
“so plausibly set forth as to make it look possible and reasonable”); 10. That the author 
make the story and its characters interesting; 11. That characters be predictable in their 
actions; 12. That the author SAY what he proposes to say, “not merely come near it”; 
13. That the author “use the right word, not its second cousin”; 14. That the author 
“eschew surplusage”; 15. That the author “not omit necessary details”; 16. That the 
author “avoid slovenliness of  form”; 17. That the author “use good grammar”; and 18. 
That the author “employ a simple and straightforward style.”
These rules call for attention to the things that undergraduates do most poorly--
and most infrequently.  They call us all, and especially our students who lack 
experience, to focus on the matter at hand; make our study clear and believable; 
include only relevant items, and make the reader see their relevance; not insult the 
reader’s intelligence; make our study interesting; and write carefully, clearly and 
accurately.  Next to the difficulty of  selecting a topic and bringing it into focus, 
students find most difficult the concept of  focus and movement in a paper.  The logic 
of  writing (that you have something to say, that you write in such a fashion that your 
reader can follow the story and indeed is drawn inexorably to your conclusion, and that 
the reader must agree with your conclusion at the end because your argument is so 
tightly woven and well-supported) escapes them.
We began, as all good historians begin, with a question: “is the story we tell our 
students--the glimpse we give them of  the discipline--complex enough to be 
complete?”  Our negative answer put us, like all good detectives, on the trail of  a 
crime, for we believe that short-changing the intellectual development of  our students 
is nothing less than a crime.  Our clues, gathered from careful bibliographic work, we 
presented as three heresies: that psychology is not a science, but something more; that 
too narrow a focus fails to address the richness of  the thought process; and that using 
a single research method impoverishes the discipline.  Our solution to the crime is to 
include historical research and a narrative presentation of  results in the psychologist’s 
teaching repertoire.  To that end we’ve pointed out the salient parts of  the process, and 
hinted at possible applications.  All that remains is to issue a warning.
In the broadest and most basic sense, scholarship means playing by the rules.  
Each method of  scholarly inquiry has its own set of  rules.  Our students are more 
likely to recognize the reality of  and necessity for playing by the rules if  they have 
multiple examples.  As any detective knows, an un-Mirandized “collar” is no “collar” at 
all.  Failure to play by the rules of  evidence gets one’s case thrown out of  court.  An 
appreciation for playing by the rules will improve our students’ scholarship.
Historical work, like detective work, is a solitary business.  But then, again as in 
detective work, the fun is in the hunt.  Endeavoring to eliminate, while thriving on, 
ambiguity is a large part of  the game--all the while remembering that reconciling 
conflicting statements is not always the answer (a tactic that assumes that both are true 
rather than both false).  We hope you’ll see some benefit for your students.  Grab your 
calabash, your deerstalker and your ulster; step into the fog of  human behavior!
